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Developing country governments and donors are 
increasingly looking to public–private partnerships 
(PPPs) to deliver growth and positive development 
outcomes in agriculture. Capturing learning from the 
experiences of two PPPs in Rwanda involving tea 
estates in two areas of the Southern province (Nshili 
and Mushubi) provides important lessons for other 
programmes with PPP arrangements. 
Eager to put the 1994 genocide and its many 
destabilising legacies behind it, the Rwandan 
government looked to the private sector for much-
needed finance to drive economic growth. The 
government, with strong input from IFAD, aimed 
to reach the most vulnerable people (particularly 
female-headed households living in poverty) in 
some of the poorest areas of the country, with a 
strategy to develop certain crops (in this case, tea). 
The two PPPs were designed and implemented as 
part of the government’s privatisation policy, from 
2003. It aimed to secure substantial public and 
private sector investment to drive an increase in 
smallholder incomes and generate new employment 
opportunities. Increased household incomes would 
contribute to poverty reduction and improve food 
security in tea-growing regions.
The model used for the PPPs at Nshili and Mushubi 
was broadly similar: 
• The private investor (in both cases a consortium) 
leased land from the government to manage 
a tea plantation and build and operate a tea 
factory. 
• The government provided infrastructure 
improvements (roads and electricity) to support 
the factory. 
• The private investor bought 85 per cent of 
shares in the factory, with the government 
granting the remaining 15 per cent to the 
cooperative (purchased by IFAD).
The two tea PPPs enabled smallholder tea growers 
to increase household incomes, which have helped 
people to acquire livelihood assets, improve the 
family diet, and pay for health insurance, among 
other important changes. They also generated 
new employment opportunities and brought 
improvements in road and energy infrastructure, 
providing a much-needed boost to the local 
economy. 
But they have also faced some important constraints, 
not least around productivity and financing. As they 
move forward, the key challenges lie in:
• risk sharing between the private investor and 
smallholder farmers, where farmers are bearing 
high risks around production, financing, and 
other key aspects of the PPP
• building viable, community-owned businesses
• consultation, voice and empowerment
• reaching the poorest smallholders
Overall, the experience of the two PPPs studied 
here suggests that development of the tea sector 
should be viewed as a long-term venture that needs 
careful planning, a sound financing model, and 
strong risk-mitigation strategies. Such partnerships 
require appropriate legal instruments to ensure 
that they function effectively, with clearly defined 
responsibilities and lines of accountability. The 
deliverables expected from each party should be 
clearly outlined, and arrangements should include 
conflict-resolution processes.
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Objectives of the case study 
This report forms part of a series of case studies 
that seek to identify key success factors for public–
private partnerships (PPPs) in rural development, 
based on learning from IFAD’s experiences with 
PPPs in four countries (Ghana, Indonesia, Rwanda 
and Uganda). The aim of this series is to support 
policy and decision-makers in government, business, 
donor agencies and farmers’ organisations to 
build more effective PPPs that bring about positive 
development outcomes sustainably and at scale. 
The study identifies key elements of PPP design and 
implementation that lead to positive (or negative) 
development outcomes for smallholders and rural 
communities, by exploring four questions:
• What constraints was the PPP set up to 
overcome, and what was its theory of change?
• What were the key features of how the PPP was 
brokered, designed and implemented? 
• What have been the development outcomes for 
smallholders and rural communities to date?
• How have these outcomes been influenced by 
the PPP brokering, design and implementation? 
Methodology
The research team conducted a desk review in Kigali 
examining key policy documents, reports and other 
data from government departments, IFAD, and other 
organisations. Fieldwork was carried out between 
June and August 2014 in Nshili (Nyaruguru district) 
and Mushubi (Nyamagabe district), both in Rwanda’s 
Southern province. It involved meetings with district 
government officers, cooperative leaders and 
members, smallholder tea growers, tea factory and 
tea plantation managers, and pluckers.
Data were collected through a mixture of key 
informant interviews, stakeholder meetings (one 
before and one after fieldwork, to share preliminary 
findings), field visits and focus group discussions 
(with beneficiary and non-beneficiary smallholders). 
The limitations of the study include the risk of bias 
from using small sample sizes. Also, the interviews 
were held at only one point in time, and may not 
therefore have reflected seasonal factors. Data 
collection was also a challenge, mainly because 
there was a lack of clearly written assumptions 
underlying the theory of change and, there were 
no specific PPP indicators in the baseline study 
for IFAD’s Smallholder Cash and Export Crops 
Development Project (PDCRE) (2003–2011) 
(described below). 
Indeed, PPP arrangements – although considered 
an important innovation in the tea sector – were 
introduced by the government in the course of the 
tea privatisation process, not as a policy instrument 
to guide the process but rather as a tool for 
implementing privatisation. It was not until 2014 that 
the Rwandan government drafted its first PPP Policy 
and Regulations guidelines.
Country context
Rwanda’s population is predominantly rural (90 per 
cent) and young (45 per cent under 14 years old). 
Its economy, which had experienced rapid growth in 
the 1960s and 1970s on the back of strong global 
markets for tea and coffee exports, had stagnated 
by the mid-1980s. A poverty rate of 70 per cent and 
a big increase in the proportion of female-headed 
households were among the many legacies of the 
1994 genocide.1  As at 2011, the national poverty 
rate stood at 44.9 per cent.2 
Political and economic context
With the restoration of peace in 1994 and the 
return of the refugees in 1995/96, the new 
government initiated policy reforms to stimulate 
economic recovery and decentralise services and 
budgets to district level, emphasising community 
participation in the planning and implementation 
of development programmes. The government’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2001) aimed to 
address major challenges constraining economic 
growth. It aimed to raise export earnings, increase 
agricultural production, support non-farming activities 
in rural areas, and diversify the economy. As part 
of its Vision 2020, the Rwandan government 
saw PPP arrangements as a vehicle for securing 
the country’s transition from a post-conflict aid-
dependent government to a self-sustaining nation 
with privatised public industries. The Rwanda 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (EDPRS) 2008–2012 sets out medium-
term objectives and financial allocations for different 
sectors. 
The tea sector
Coffee and tea are Rwanda’s major export products. 
From the late 1990s until 2012, the vast majority 
of the country’s tea factories and estates, which 
were owned by the government and run through the 
parastatal OCIR-THE,3  were privatised through the 
establishment of PPPs.4  
The Rwandan government implemented its first 
Tea Development Strategy from 2003 to 2010, 
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designed to address the sector’s main challenges, 
namely: low incomes for smallholder tea growers, 
the low yield of green leaves (as well as poor quality 
and supply of green leaves and limited use of 
fertiliser), lack of product diversification, enhancing 
value added through branding and packaging, and 
improving marketing (through direct sales instead 
of at Mombasa auctions). The strategy succeeded, 
enhancing quality and increasing production, from 
14,500 MT in 2000 to 24,066 MT in 2011.
Overview of the PPP
This study focuses on two established PPPs 
(at Nshili and Mushubi, in Southern province), 
both facilitated and funded by IFAD (the specific 
arrangements for each are summarised below). 
They emerged from a previous IFAD-supported 
government of Rwanda project, the Smallholder 
Cash and Export Crops Development Project 
(PDCRE), which ran from 2003 to 2011 and 
supported smallholder tea growers to develop 
their production and form two cooperatives5 – 
known as COTHENK in Nshili, and COTHEGAB in 
Mushubi. From 2011 onwards, through a follow-on 
project (Rural Incomes through Export Project, or 
PRICE), IFAD has continued to provide technical 
and financial support for tea development and 
cooperative capacity building while facilitating and 
strengthening the two existing PPPs. It also plans to 
develop greenfield sites in Gatare, Rutsiro, Karongi 
and Muganza-Kivu for tea production, using lessons 
drawn from PDCRE. 
Partnership agreements
The first partnership agreement was signed in 2006 
in Nshili to rehabilitate a tea plantation formerly 
owned by the government, to establish a tea factory, 
and to develop smallholder tea farming. The second 
PPP, at Mushubi, saw an agreement signed in 2009, 
which introduced tea growing for the first time in 
the area, setting up a factory and tea plantations 
managed by the private investor and by smallholder 
farmers. These two PPPs are based on a general 
agreement signed between the government of 
Rwanda (represented by the National Export 
Development Board or NAEB), and a private sector 
consortium (which involved different businesses at 
each site).
In Nshili, the private consortium comprises three 
companies: 
• BARCO (the majority shareholder)
• Rujugiro
• MIG (Multisectorielle d’Investissement de 
Gikongoro). 
BARCO is a UK-registered company; Rujugiro is a 
local businessman, while MIG is a locally registered 
company operating in Southern province. 
In Mushubi, the private investor is also a consortium, 
comprising:
• MIG (the majority shareholder)
• SORAS (Société Rwandaise d’Assurances), a 
local insurance company
• SPIC (Southern Province-owned Investment 
Company).
These two agreements stipulated that the private 
investor would lease land from the government to 
manage a tea plantation (known as an industrial 
bloc) and build and operate a tea factory. The 
government agreed to provide the necessary 
infrastructure (roads, electricity) to support 
the factory. The private investor would hold 85 
per cent of the shares in the factory, while the 
government granted the remaining 15 per cent6 to 
the cooperative at each site. There is, however, no 
agreement signed between the private investor and 
the cooperative. The factory is supplied with green 
leaf tea by the private investor’s plantation, individual 
smallholders (Thé Villageois or TV) who own small 
plots between 0.25 and 0.5 ha (all of whom are 
members of the cooperatives) and, in Nshili only, a 
smallholder cooperative plantation.  
Amounts invested by each partner
The total amount invested by the Rwandan 
government (financing construction, upgrading and 
maintenance of roads, establishing the electricity 
grid, and supporting tea development) is not known. 
Investments by other partners were as follows:
• Construction of the factory in Nshili by the 
private investor – $5 million (RWF 3 billion) and 
in Mushubi by the private investor - $7 million 
(RWF 4.8 billion)7 
• Smallholders’ shares in the tea factory – 
approx. $220.000 (RWF 150 million) for each 
cooperative - financed by IFAD through the 
government
• Support to cooperatives and smallholders to 
develop their tea plantations – total amount 
unknown (support provided by IFAD through 
OCIR-THE/NAEB)
• Smallholders’ labour in establishing and 
developing tea plots – total amount unknown
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PPP modalities in each site
 
Nshili
In Nshili, tea production covers 1,478 ha, split as 
follows: 
• an industrial bloc of 731 ha leased from the 
government by the Nshili Kivu Tea Plantation 
(NKTP), which is 100 per cent owned by the 
private consortium
• a cooperative bloc of 225 ha given by the 
government to COTHENK, and a newly 
cultivated cooperative bloc of 222 ha, financed 
by PDCRE 
• individual privately owned smallholder plots 
totalling 300 ha belonging to 352 Thé Villageois 
(TV), financed by an eight-year loan from 
Banque Rwandaise de Développement (BRD), 
granted in 2009. (It is important to note that tea 
bushes have a three-year gestation period and 
take around seven to eight years to reach their 
full productive potential of  7–8 MT/ha.)
Mushubi
In Mushubi, tea production covers 1,397 ha, split as 
follows: 
• an industrial bloc of 460 ha leased from the 
government by the Nyungwe Highland Tea 
Company (NHTC), which is 100 per cent owned 
by the private consortium
• individual privately owned smallholder plots 
totalling 937 ha belonging to 966 Thé Villageois 
(TV), of which 350 ha are fully productive, 137 
ha are partially productive, and 450 ha are newly 
planted plots. These are all grown on privately 
owned land, with development supported by an 
eight-year loan from BRD, granted in 2009.  
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Figure 1: PPPP arrangement in tea palm value chain in Rwanda
In Mushubi, the tea factory (the Nile Tea Company or 
NTC), which only began operating in October 2013, 
has a different shareholding structure, with 70 per 
cent owned by the private consortium, 15 per cent 
by the government (through the NAEB),8  and 15 per 
cent by the cooperative. 
Comparison of the two modalities
There were many similarities between the two sites 
(no major differences in terms of agro-ecological 
zones, low fertility soils, limited food production, 
few alternative employment options). However, in 
Nshili, farmers had some prior knowledge of tea 
production, and tea development started there much 
earlier (1983) than in Mushubi (2004). Furthermore, 
the factory in Nshili has been operational since 
2008, while in Mushubi started in 2013. Extension 
work and tea development has therefore been more 
challenging in Mushubi. While the cooperatives in 
both sites are still comparatively weak, COTHENK 
(Nshili) seems to be better organised and have a 
more dedicated membership. There also appear 
to be some differences between the two sites in 
terms of the relationships and dialogue between the 
cooperative and the tea factory. 
In Nshili, dialogue between COTHENK and NKTF is 
better structured and organised, while in Mushubi, 
dialogue between COTHEGAB and the tea factory 
owners is not formalised. This may be a reflection of 
the fact that COTHENK and NKTF started to work 
together since 2008, and Mushubi did not start until 
2013 (see table 1 below for key features of the two 
cooperatives). Also, COTHENK has its own tea 
plots, while COTHEGAB does not own any; only its 
individual members do.  
Theory of change
Although there was a theory of change behind 
the PPPs, it was not documented early on, and 
turned out to be based on assumptions not clearly 
articulated. In line with its privatisation policy, the 
government was looking for private investors for 
long-term partnerships who could commit funds to 
build factories and partner with tea growers, in two 
very poor and underdeveloped areas of the country. 
This partnership would help smallholders increase 
their green leaves productivity while adding value 
through a processing plant, which would boost 
incomes further by providing opportunities for casual 
labour, as well as dividends to producers through 
their shareholdings. Spillover effects of increasing 
smallholders’ incomes would include better health, 
nutrition and housing, while upgraded roads and 
other infrastructure would enable new business 
centres to emerge in the two areas.
Assumptions were made in a number of areas, 
particularly around technical capacity and social 
capital, including, for instance: 
• a stronger capacity of the cooperatives and their 
aptitude for running a business
• productivity levels smallholders were able to 
achieve during early years assumed to be higher
• smallholders’ willingness to focus on tea 
production rather than other crops
• higher cooperatives’ ability to meet loan 
repayments after three years.
When  
established
Membership Members in-
volved in the tea 
PPP
Tea plots (ha) Cooperative 
shares in tea 
factory
COTHENK
(Nshili)
(Nshili Kivu, 
Nyaruguru 
district)
Created 
2005, official-
ly approved 
2011
Factory 
operational in 
2008
2,560, 
38% women
3529 Comprehensive research, CO-
THENK plantation: 447 ha 
TV: 300 ha individual plots
15%
COTHEGAB
(Mushubi)
(Gatare-
Buruhukiro, 
Nyamagabe 
district)
Created 
2007, official-
ly approved 
2011
Factory 
operational in 
2013
966, 
28% women
966 TV: 937 ha individual plots 
available, of which 350 ha cur-
rently under production
15% share in 
the Nyungwe 
Highland Tea 
Company 
(NHTC), which 
owns the fac-
tory
Table 1: Key features of the two cooperatives involved in the PPPs
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Analysis 
Key elements of the PPP
Design
In parallel with its privatisation policy, in 2003, the 
Rwandan government, together with IFAD, pursued 
the establishment of partnerships to support the 
rehabilitation of the tea sector in two less-developed 
areas of the country where alternative livelihood 
options for rural households were limited. The two 
PPPs were set up between newly established tea-
producing cooperatives, selected private investors, 
and the government. 
The government established these two PPPs to 
improve the productivity of its tea plantations, and, 
at the same time, to introduce farmers to growing 
tea as a way of increasing incomes and reducing 
poverty. To improve tea sector yields, it focused 
on improving smallholders’ access to inputs and 
services, and revisited its tea pricing policy. The 
government, supported by IFAD, organised the 
farmers into cooperatives and provided them with 
technical and financial support. To guarantee their 
representation and linkages with the private investor, 
and as an additional incentive, each cooperative 
was granted a 15 per cent shareholding in the tea 
factory, yet there is no agreement signed between 
the factory and the cooperative. 
To attract private investors to build a tea factory in 
these less-developed areas, the government offered 
various incentives: 
• leasing land to the private investor
• the opportunity to manage part of the tea 
plantation formerly owned by the government 
(the industrial bloc)
• state provision of infrastructure (roads and 
electricity).  
The government was looking for a private investor 
partner to build and operate the factory and 
manage the industrial bloc, and to form a long-term 
partnership with smallholder tea growers. However, 
it did not operate a competitive bidding process 
to select the main investor. Instead, it opted for a 
non-competitive bid, partly reflecting the remote 
and underdeveloped nature of both sites, which 
were deemed unattractive to private companies and 
therefore did not lend themselves to a competitive 
bid. The government identified a potential private 
investor and offered the incentives package listed 
above. In both sites, it approached a local private 
investor (MIG) that had knowledge of the tea sector. 
The company was also familiar with the government 
and the national context, which helped to build trust. 
The government’s agreement with the main investor 
stipulated that the latter could not increase the 
size of its plantation beyond 30 per cent of the 
total acreage (currently at Nshili, the industrial 
bloc accounts for half of the total acreage under 
cultivation, though this is expected to be reduced 
as more TV members plant further tea plots; at 
Mushubi, the industrial bloc accounts for 32 per 
cent). This was designed to ensure that the factory 
needed to secure supplies from the cooperative 
bloc and the TV to be profitable, giving all partners a 
shared incentive to make the PPP work. 
IFAD supported the PPPs through the PDCRE/
PRICE, playing a key role in facilitating and 
brokering the arrangements with the Rwandan 
government and other partners throughout the 
design and implementation stages. Among its many 
roles, IFAD: 
• provided funding to develop the institutional 
capacity of the cooperative in each site
• provided funding to purchase each cooperative’s 
15 per cent equity share in the tea factory (worth 
$220,000)10 
• financed the feasibility study for the Mushubi tea 
factory
• helped negotiate loan terms with the BRD and 
the government on behalf of smallholder tea 
growers
• helped to select beneficiaries, ensuring the 
inclusion of women smallholders as a key means 
of reducing rural poverty 
• provided and funded technical assistance to 
the government, the private investor, and the 
cooperatives as well as to individual tea growers 
Implementation
In each PPP, the main investor contributed financing 
(to build the tea factory), working capital, and 
technical and managerial skills for tea processing, 
marketing and selling, as well as training staff. 
The role of the cooperative was to guarantee a 
regular supply of quality green leaves to the factory, 
while liaising with external partners for training 
of their members (in tea crop management and 
organisational skills), and representing them at 
meetings with the factory board meetings and 
government officials. 
The interdependence between the factory and 
smallholder tea growers (given that yield from the 
industrial bloc alone would not be sufficient for the 
factory to function) has led to a strong relationship 
between the factories and cooperatives on 
operational matters such as productivity, transport 
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and fertiliser. However, there are no written 
agreements between the main investor and the 
cooperative, so there are no clearly defined linkages 
between the factories and tea growers in terms of 
responsibilities and lines of accountability for factory 
management. Furthermore, during the negotiations 
for the PPPs, neither the government nor the main 
private investor consulted the tea growers on 
business plans for the factories.
In Nshili, the tea plantation company (NKTP) 
currently provides most of the green leaves 
processed by the factory. COTHENK supplies 
a relatively small proportion, while individual 
smallholders (TV) only started supplying the factory 
in 2010. The cooperative blocs (447 ha) and TV 
blocs (300 ha) received government extension 
support through the PDCRE/PRICE projects in 
terms of nursery preparation, initial planting costs, 
and cropping techniques. In addition, the tea 
factory supports COTHENK by providing subsidised 
fertiliser (at 50 per cent of its market price) (see 
box below for details of the pricing mechanism) as 
well as technical and logistical support (infilling, 
transportation services, etc). In Mushubi, MIG and 
the NHTC provide logistical support to COTHEGAB 
(transportation, tea plantation expansion).
Despite strong external support, in its first few years, 
the tea factory at Nshili experienced considerable 
financial constraints, partly because it was not yet 
connected to the electricity grid so incurred high fuel 
costs. The high ‘vacancy’ rate (the proportion of dead 
trees) is a major problem for all tea blocs (industrial, 
cooperative or TV). In Nshili, this is due to the 
legacy of poor practices before privatisation, while in 
Mushubi, the high vacancy rate is due to poor soil, 
poor crop management and inadequate fertiliser to 
support young trees. A high vacancy rate was not 
factored in during the design stage, so no financial 
provisions were made to address this.
Pricing
The price of tea used to be set by the government at a uniform flat rate, irrespective of producer 
constraints and labour markets. High-quality leaves were not incentivised or remunerated. The World 
Bank deemed this pricing system to be incompatible with the long-term sustainability of the tea industry 
in Rwanda. In addition, pluckers were paid below-market wages, which led to shortages, longer plucking 
rounds and low leaf quality.11  
In 2014, the government asked the World Bank to design a new pricing mechanism on the basis of 
the international market for processed tea. This means the price of green leaves would be set as a 
percentage of made-tea prices on international markets. These new arrangements should strengthen 
profits for producers and processors.
Despite higher operating costs in Rwanda than in neighbouring countries, a more equitable price for 
made tea should increase tea growers’ incomes. (The net income ranges from RWF 25.4 to 49.2, 
depending on whether labour needs to be hired in.) This represents between a quarter and a half of the 
purchase price for green leaves, or between 5.8% and 11.4% of the made tea sale price. By comparison, 
in Tanzania, for example, tea growers receive 27% of the made tea price; this figure is almost 75% for 
tea growers in Kenya. 
The World Bank suggested a system whereby the price of green leaves should increase gradually, from 
35% of auction prices (July 2012), reaching 50% by July 2015. As the new system links the price of 
green leaves to the auction price, this should motivate farmers to produce more higher-quality leaves. 
But should the international auction price for green leaves fall, growers will receive at least RWF 100-
105/kg, a national minimum average set by the government. 
This new mechanism is expected to raise factory quality standards and boost tea exports while helping 
smallholders move out of poverty. The World Bank estimates that factory margins should gradually 
reduce from 35% to 13%, but still be highly profitable. At the same time, smallholder incomes should 
increase by almost 140%, making significant inroads towards poverty alleviation targets. However, the 
impact of the new pricing policy has yet to be evaluated.
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However, the NKTF has succeeded in making a 
profit, paying dividends to COTHENK in 2013 of 
RWF 45 million, some of which was used to buy a 
truck so that COTHENK no longer had to rely on 
NKTF for transporting the leaves. The factory in 
Mushubi only began operating in October 2013, so 
has not yet paid dividends. 
In terms of financing, both cooperatives took loans 
from the Banque Rwandaise De Développement 
(BRD) (over an eight-year period, at 8.5 per cent 
interest) to finance tea expansion and purchases of 
fertiliser and other inputs, using their equity share 
and land titles as collateral. The loan agreement 
stipulated that individual beneficiaries would start 
making repayments at year three (i.e., 2013 for Nshili 
and 2014 for Mushubi), assuming a yield of 6-7 MT/
ha per year. In 2014, BRD provided an additional 
loan to COTHEGAB in Mushubi. Terms and 
conditions are almost the same as in the previous 
loan.  
While the recorded yields are increasing each 
year at each site, they are still far below the 
expected yield set out in the loan feasibility study. 
During their early discussions about the PPP, the 
Rwandan government and IFAD assumed that tea 
production was not only viable in the two areas but 
also profitable in the short term. But tea growing is 
a relatively costly livelihood and requires longer-
term investment to deliver optimal outputs (bushes 
take at least three years to produce leaves, and up 
to eight years to reach maturity), while ecological 
and environmental factors can represent important 
constraints. In addition, poor crop management 
practices on the land prior to privatisation have 
led to high ‘vacancy’ rates (20–30 per cent) on 
cooperative land, limiting any potential increase in 
short-term yields. As a result, all tea blocs (whether 
industrial, cooperative or Thé Villageois) incur high 
‘infilling’ costs, for which no financial provisions have 
been made. This has given rise to major challenges 
around loan sustainability (see later section).
The BRD loans to smallholder tea growers are 
strictly limited to inputs needed for tea production 
(eg, fertiliser), not for other crops or income-
generating activities. According to the focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews at both 
sites, tea growers have not used the loans for other 
purposes (such as investing in livestock or housing 
improvements, etc.), since the loans are released in 
instalments based on accomplishing certain tasks 
on the tea plots. While productivity remains well 
below its potential, it is important to understand 
that smallholders’ incomes are derived partly from 
the sale of green leaf tea, and partly from waged 
labour (in the factory, on tea estates, or as labourers/
pluckers). 
Brokering
The Rwandan government played a key role in 
driving the PPPs to develop the tea sector. It acted 
as an enabler, attracting private investors by creating 
a conducive policy environment and offering financial 
incentives, negotiating long-term lease agreements, 
mobilising farmers by providing extension services, 
and improving local infrastructure in the selected 
areas.
IFAD played the role of enabler from the design 
stage through to implementation (for instance, 
funding and conducting a feasibility study for the tea 
factory in Mushubi and developing the reformulated 
tea component of PDCRE for both sites). It also 
provided funding channelled through the two 
government programmes, PDCRE and PRICE, 
and has taken a lead role in programme monitoring 
and evaluation. IFAD also focused on ensuring 
that the poorest smallholders would be among 
the beneficiaries (30 per cent of whom were to be 
female-headed households).
Productivity 
Both sites suffer from low productivity. At 
Nshili, this is due to poor tea bush care prior to 
privatisation, a high vacancy rate (after infilling, 
new bushes have low yield in first few years), 
high altitude, poor ability of soil to retain water, 
and use of a low-yield tea clone (which accounts 
for 70 per cent of the area planted). Yields are 
higher on the NKTP-managed blocs. At Nshili, 
the yield on COTHENK plots has increased 
considerably since privatisation, from 1,707kg/
ha in 2007 to 3,594kg/ha in 2013.12  The NKTP 
yield increased from 2,042kg/ha in 2004 to 
4,318kg/ha in 2013. The yield gap between the 
two blocs has been narrowing over time and 
continues to do so.
At Mushubi, the yield on COTHEGAB-managed 
plots is low (2.5 MT/ha) compared with NHTC-
managed blocs (4–5 MT/ha), and the vacancy 
rate is higher (30 per cent compared with 
10–20 per cent). Production constraints include 
limited use of fertiliser (due to a complicated 
and lengthy procurement system and transport 
delays) and lack of casual labour at peak times 
(many labourers opt for potato production), with 
rising labour costs keeping tea growers’ profit 
margins low.
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Development outcomes 
This section is in no way intended to be an 
evaluation of the two PPPs or their outcomes. 
Instead, we focus on the extent to which the PPPs 
were a successful instrument for achieving the 
PPPs’ objectives of increasing productivity, boosting, 
upgrading infrastructure, and enabling development.
The two PPP arrangements have delivered some 
impressive achievements at the household level in 
a relatively short period of time – notably in relation 
to ownership of assets, new job opportunities and 
increased household incomes, and ability to meet 
basic needs and pay for basic services (see boxes 
for what this means to individual families). 
 
 
The PDCRE: Helping families diversify 
livelihoods and afford health insurance 
Before 2008, Mageza Gervais, a tea grower 
in Gatare sector, Mushubi, was struggling to 
earn RWF 2,000 (c. $29) a month, migrating 
to Mayaga (70km away) for seasonal labour. 
He had to leave his family for long periods and 
was not able to support them. But in 2008 he 
managed to acquire a 1.4 ha tea plot with the 
support of the government, through the PDCRE. 
Now, he earns around RWF 15,000 a month (c. 
$257 a year) – almost eight times what he used 
to earn. With the income he has earned from 
selling green leaf tea he has bought a pig and 
two goats. He has built a new house with an 
iron sheet roof, and has opened an account at 
the local bank, which provides access to loans. 
He and his family are enrolled in the universal 
health care scheme.
margins low.
The PDCRE: Helping families improve 
their diet and afford school fees
Bakanirora Edureda lives in Gatare sector, 
Mushubi. Through the PDCRE, the government 
helped her acquire a 1.5 ha tea plot. In 2006, 
she could only afford to eat Irish potato and 
struggled to earn RWF 3,000 a month (c. $51 a 
year). Now, she earns eight times that amount. 
She has bought a cow so that the family can 
have milk. And she can afford to pay her 
children’s school fees. She is also a member 
of her local Savings and Credit Co-operative 
(SACCO).
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Table 1: Summary of development outcomes achieved by Rwanda’s public–private partnerships in the tea  
sector at Nshili 
Development  
outcomes
Baseline (2006) survey Outcomes7 Evidence and attribution to PPP
Food security: 
Access to food 
all year round 
(without needing to 
borrow money or 
food to meet basic 
consumption needs) 
Limited food produc-
tion due to poor soil 
productivity and lack of 
income
In 2004, the number 
of people having 3 
meals/ day was 4% 
in Mushubi and 5% in 
Nshili
Animal products con-
sumption was limited
Food production increased in 
Nshili and Mushubi.  By 2010, 
number of people having 3 meals 
increased to 9% in Mushubi and 
10% in Nshili
Focus group discussion in Mush-
ubi and Nshili confirmed greater 
access to food and more diversity 
through (i) improved production 
and (ii) local food purchase on 
markets 
President of COTHEGAB coopera-
tive (also a medical technician) 
confirmed a decrease in under-
fives with protein deficiency in 
tea-growing households
Increased income from tea 
enabled farmers to invest in soil 
productivity (fertiliser, seeds, 
lime, etc), and animal production 
provides manure which improved 
productivity
Tea growers managed to acquire 
dairy cows and small animals in 
both Nshili and Mushubi (goats, 
pigs, chickens, etc) or to access 
meat and milk through local 
purchase 
Assets: Household 
income (measured 
in terms of access 
to or ownership of 
key assets such as 
electricity, forms 
of transportation, 
communication 
devices or types of 
cooking fuel)
In 2006, no data on 
number of  houses 
with tile roofs and con-
structed with bricks
No. households own-
ing a radio: 44% in 
Mushubi and 50% in 
Nshili
In 2010, the number of households 
with roofs covered by tiles had 
increased by 29% while those with 
grass roofs haddecreased by 88%; 
those with brick-built houses had 
increased by 120% in tea-growing 
sites
In 2009, the number of households 
owning a radio: 91% in Mushubi 
and 60% in Nshili
Evidenced through PDCRE 
Impact Assessment of 2010 and 
focus group discussions at Nshili 
and Mushubi in July 2014
Wellbeing: 
Perceptions of 
wellbeing among 
farmers and other 
community members 
Health :  no universal 
medical coverage 
available in Nshili and 
Mushubi
Water facilities non-
existent
No electricity
By 2010, 84% of tea-growers 
in Mushubi and 80% in Nshili 
were affiliated to medical health 
insurance (Mutuelle de Santé
Water facilities developed
Number of smallholder tea 
growers with houses connected to 
electricity grid increased in Nshili 
and Mushubi;
Smallholder houses connected 
with electricity grid in Nshili and 
Mushubi is higher than houses 
belonging to non-tea growers in 
both sites
Land tenure 
issues: access to 
land and security of 
tenure
Land was owned but 
not officially registered 
with titles. Land 
administered under 
both customary and 
national law
Number of hectares 
owned cooperatives in 
Nshili = 0
COTHENK cooperative, in Nishili, 
owns 447 ha.
Land registered under law with 
certificate, in 2014, 310 ha. in 
Nishili owned by 352 members 
and 937 ha. in Mushubi owned 
by 966 members. So land tenure 
better protected than before. 
937ha of TVs financed by BRD 
and managed by 966 individual 
TV in Mushubi
310 ha. of tea plot financed by 
BRD and managed by 352 indi-
vidual TV in Nishili
447 ha. granted by the govern-
ment, owned and managed by 
COTHENK (2,560) supported by 
PDCRE
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Development  
outcomes
Baseline (2006) 
survey
Outcomes Evidence and attribution to PPP
Empowerment: 
Voice and influence 
in decision-making 
processes (e.g. 
policy processes, 
No baseline There is still a long way to go before 
smallholder farmers will be em-
powered to play a greater role in 
local- and national-level discussions 
and decision-making – for instance, 
participating in price negotiation
There is a sense that despite being 
shareholders, the cooperatives still 
lack a sense of ownership of the fac-
tory companies
COTHENK was created in Nshili 
and COTHEGAB in Mushubi to 
organise and empower smallholder 
tea growers
The emphasis is on establishing 
autonomous producers, capable of 
adding value to tea green leaves 
instead of maximising commodity 
production
Gender 
empowerment: 
Involvement, 
by women who 
participate in crop 
production, in farm 
decision-making  
No baseline Improvement: women have gained 
a say in coop activities, as board 
members or members of manage-
ment team
In both COTHENK and COTHE-
GAB, women are board members, 
while others have responsibilities for 
managing the cooperatives
Access to services 
and infrastructure
In 2004, no 
feeder road 
available in 
tea plots, no 
electricity 
connection
Inputs made available have improved 
soil productivity 
Feeder roads and electricity 
grid constructed. But some road 
segments in Nshili are not upgraded, 
increasing costs of some inputs 
compared to competitor sites (e.g. 
energy, transport).In Mushubi, 
frequent power fluctuations and 
failures affect product quality and 
increase production costs, as does 
the lack of transport for COTHEGAB, 
with high transport fees
Upgraded roads have facilitated the 
transport of tea to Mombasa auction 
and promoted development of busi-
ness centres
MIG management team confirmed 
and appreciated the role of the 
government in upgrading roads and 
providing electricity in both regions
Risk management: 
Farmers’ exposure 
to risk (considering 
also how this is 
affected by risk-
sharing within 
the PPP or risk 
management 
measures like 
weather index 
insurance)
No baseline Tea production is a long-term 
investment with lots of risks.  
Bushes take 3–4 years to start 
producing, only reaching peak 
yield by 7–8 years. Farmers bear 
the risk of upfront investment, with 
the expectation of return on this 
investment later
Based on group discussions and 
key informants interviews: both 
cooperatives have contracted un-
sustainable loans using their equity 
share and land titles as collateral.  
Repayment of loans hampered by 
low tea productivity
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Linking the PPP and the development 
outcomes
A 2010 impact assessment of the PDCRE  
considered the main development outcomes from 
the tea PPPs in Nshili and Mushubi. It found the 
following positive outcomes. 
•	 Tea growers had increased their incomes 
through selling green leaves and working 
in the factories as wage labourers, pluckers, 
cleaners, etc. Households have been able to use 
some of their extra income to invest in animals 
and other assets, while financial institutions 
(Savings and Credit Co-operatives) are now 
operating in both areas.  
•	 In both areas, the cooperative and its 
members now have considerable land 
planted with tea (COTHENK 747 ha, 
COTHEGAB 937 ha) as well as shares in 
the tea factory. The PPPs are also linked to 
improvements in roads and electricity supply in 
both areas, as well as economic development in 
the broader community. 
•	 From a baseline of zero, 84 per cent of tea 
growers in Mushubi and 80 per cent in Nshili 
now have health insurance (through the 
Mutuelle de Santé). In Mushubi, the President 
of COTHEGAB, who is also a health official, 
confirmed that the cooperative mobilises its 
members around health issues (vaccination, 
sanitation, hygiene, reproductive health issues, 
etc). 
•	 There have been notable improvements in 
household food security. For instance, the 
number of households in Mushubi eating three 
meals a day increased from 4 per cent to 9 
per cent (between 2004 and 2010), and from 
5 per cent to 10 per cent in Nshili. In Mushubi, 
between 2006 and 2009, the proportion of tea 
grower households that could afford to consume 
proteins increased from 56 per cent to 79 per 
cent (and from 49 per cent to 77 per cent in 
Nshili) as a result of increased incomes and 
investments in animal production. 
•	 The PPPs have generated large numbers 
of permanent and seasonal jobs, as well 
as temporary work in transportation and 
construction, in areas where livelihood options 
were fairly limited previously.  Before the PPPs, 
up to 40 per cent of the labour force in both 
areas used to migrate to find seasonal work in 
Mayaga and other regions of the country. Today, 
there is no seasonal out-migration; the rural poor 
from other areas come to Nshili and Mushubi to 
find work.
•	 According to COTHEGAB’s president, taken 
together, the changes that have resulted from 
the PPPs have proved ‘transformational’, not 
just for the households involved but others who 
have experienced the knock-on effects of local 
development. 
Challenges
One of the biggest challenges facing the PPPs is 
that high production costs, coupled with limited 
outputs, may jeopardise the economic viability 
of the tea factories at Nshili and Mushubi in the 
medium term. Cooperative yields are low due to low 
productivity, poor-quality seedlings and high vacancy 
rates, undermining smallholders’ ability to meet loan 
repayments. Due to insufficient supplies of green 
leaf tea, both factories currently operate well below 
nominal capacity – 30 per cent in Mushubi (where 
nominal capacity is 3,500 MT/year of made tea) 
and 40 per cent in Nshili (where nominal capacity 
is 3,000 MT/year of made tea). In addition, costs of 
certain factory inputs such as energy and transport 
are much higher when compared with competitors. 
Despite laudable increases in productivity, there 
remain tensions between the private investor and 
the cooperatives. At both sites, the private investor 
considers that the cooperatives are not doing 
enough to further increase productivity through more 
intensive crop management, weeding, pruning, and 
proper use of fertiliser. In addition, factory operations 
(receiving and weighing the leaves, processing, 
procurement, accounting and marketing/auctioning) 
are performed solely by factory staff and do not 
involve the cooperatives’ management team. A lack 
of transparency and involvement in these operations 
may lead to mistrust between both parties. When it 
comes to strategic decisions (investments to make, 
modification of business model, auctioning, etc.) the 
private investor does not involve the cooperative at 
either site.
Although the tea factory at Nshili has begun paying 
dividends to the cooperative, this has taken five 
years since operations began. The factory incurred 
high operating costs in its first three years until it was 
connected to the national electricity grid. Poor roads 
in some areas still lead to high transportation costs 
and losses due to damage to leaves. 
13BROKERING DEVELOPMENT: ENABLING FACTORS FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAINSSUMMARY OF RWANDA CASE STUDY
Capturing 
learning from 
the PPP
Promoting shared interests: The PPPs were 
designed to incentivise partners to work together to 
achieve shared success, by ensuring that the factory 
needed to secure supplies from the cooperative 
bloc and the TV to be profitable. As noted though, 
unless the cooperatives can significantly increase 
productivity at each site, their viability is at stake. 
This issue is beginning to be addressed at the 
operational level, with the factory at Nshili recently 
introducing a new system that pays a bonus to tea 
growers who supply high-quality leaves as a way of 
incentivising improved productivity.
The importance of a ‘roadmap’ for PPPs: At the 
time IFAD was implementing its PDCRE project, the 
government was beginning to privatise tea factories 
and estates. The PPP objectives were clearly aligned 
with IFAD’s objectives (as reflected in the PDCRE’s 
Reformulated Tea Component of 2006).  But there 
was no PPP ‘roadmap’ detailing or formalising 
the processes involved, the responsibilities of 
each party, risk-sharing arrangements or lines of 
accountability. Nor was there a clearly articulated 
theory of change describing how the tea PPPs would 
deliver development outcomes for smallholder tea 
growers, increasing their incomes and diversifying 
their livelihoods. It was only in June 2014 that the 
Rwandan government drafted its first ever PPP 
law and policy framework – ten years after the 
privatisation of tea in Nshili and Mushubi began 
through the PPPs. 
•	 Consulting smallholder producers: There 
was little involvement of smallholder tea growers 
and cooperatives in the negotiations for the 
PPPs, which meant it was difficult to establish 
arrangements that clearly took into account their 
needs and capacities. Some of the challenges 
around production constraints, alternative 
income sources in the early years of production, 
and loan arrangements could have been tackled 
head-on if smallholders had been consulted and 
involved in programme planning. 
•	 IFAD’s role: IFAD’s involvement early on 
was critical – negotiating with the Rwandan 
government about the feasibility of the projects, 
developing the reformulated tea component of 
the PDCRE in 2006, and providing funds (for 
development of the sector and of cooperatives), 
particularly in ensuring a focus on reaching the 
poorest smallholders in the least developed 
areas of the country. However, future ventures 
may benefit from IFAD playing a stronger role 
in identifying appropriate technical expertise to 
support business planning. This may help avoid 
some of the problems encountered by the PPPs 
at Nshili and Mushubi (for instance, the situation 
with unsustainable BRD loans). 
•	 Risk-sharing: It appears that the smallholder 
tea growers involved in the PPPs at both sites 
bear a very high risk. Both cooperatives (and 
their members) are now heavily indebted 
to the BRD, putting their future in jeopardy. 
Smallholders find it difficult to meet repayments, 
incurring penalties for arrears, and it is unclear 
how these loans will be repaid without major 
increases in productivity, which, as noted, are 
unlikely to be forthcoming in the short term 
at least. Unless a solution is found that is 
acceptable to all parties (which may require 
transforming the loan to a grant), it is possible 
that the BRD could take over the land held 
by the cooperatives, and their respective 
shares in the tea factory companies at both 
sites – threatening to undo the many positive 
development outcomes achieved by the PPPs to 
date.  
•	 Building viable, community-owned 
businesses: The PDCRE aimed to build 
viable, community-owned businesses rather 
than pursue commodity production targets at 
any cost. It has succeeded in setting up and 
supporting independent producer groups (two 
cooperatives) in Nshili and Mushubi, which 
are actively representing and defending their 
members’ interests. 
 
The government might have expected that by 
working closely with the private investor in the 
tea factory, the cooperatives would absorb 
some business ‘know-how’ and strengthen their 
institutional development capacity as a result. 
But this has not happened. Although there is 
direct collaboration between the cooperative 
and the tea factory, this is usually limited to 
operational matters; there are no processes for 
ensuring that cooperative leaders gain business 
experience and skills required for cooperatives 
to occupy a stronger position in the value chain, 
which would bring additional benefits for their 
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members. Cooperative leaders could benefit 
from more intensive support with financial 
management, knowledge about managing a tea 
factory, and marketing/auctioning tea.  
 
It is important to remember, though, that 
the cooperatives have only recently been 
established (COTHENK in 2005 and 
COTHEGAB in 2007), and organisational 
development is neither a short-term nor a linear 
process. In their eagerness to move forward 
with the PPPs, the Rwandan government and 
IFAD perhaps paid insufficient attention to the 
time, resources and investment needed for 
cooperatives to become viable, strong and 
financially independent institutions.These kind of 
outcomes require long-term business planning 
and financial strategies, which were absent. 
Today, both cooperatives are still receiving 
support for capacity building and institutional 
development from the government and IFAD, 
while the PRICE project is still subsidising 
infilling operations, nursery preparation and 
plantation expansion, and providing extension 
services to cooperatives and smallholders.
 
•	 Voice and empowerment: Giving cooperatives 
a 15 per cent shareholding in the tea factory 
was a positive innovation, which is producing 
dividends already in Nshili, but this percentage is 
too small to give cooperatives a significant role 
in strategic decision-making in the PPP (e.g. on 
annual targets, major purchases of equipment 
and other investments in the factory, and in 
negotiations with tea brokers, at auctions, or in 
meetings with government officials). In Mushubi, 
the private investor has called for a review of the 
shareholding arrangements, pushing for a 93 per 
cent stake due to higher-than-anticipated costs 
of factory construction (completed in 2013). This 
would leave COTHEGAB and the government 
with not much more than a token shareholding of 
3.5 per cent each. Not surprisingly, COTHEGAB 
is unhappy with this proposal, presenting a 
potential conflict between the two parties for 
which there is no framework to resolve.  
•	 This learning is already feeding through: the 
PDCRE’s interim evaluation report recommends 
a larger proportion of shares (40–50 per cent) for 
cooperatives involved in new tea ventures, with 
the dual aim of increasing their dividends and 
giving them a greater say in management and 
strategic decision-making. 
 
•	 Reaching the poorest households: In 
Mushubi, because the poorest smallholders 
had limited plots (less than 0.5 ha) and few 
alternative income-earning options, they 
struggled to meet their basic food needs and 
earn a livelihood during the first three years (the 
time it takes for tea bushes to begin producing 
leaves). Learning from this experience has 
already been captured, in that the PDCRE’s 
interim evaluation report recommended that the 
follow-on project (PRICE) included a cash-for-
work/food-for-work component to enable farmers 
to meet their basic needs until such time as the 
crop provides an income, and to ensure their 
continued involvement in what is a long-term 
venture.
To conclude, overall, the profitability of tea 
growing through PPPs should be viewed as a 
long-term venture that needs careful planning, a 
sound financing model, and strong risk mitigation 
strategies. PPPs in the tea sector require appropriate 
instruments to ensure that they function effectively 
in terms of service delivery, with clearly defined 
responsibilities and lines of accountability; the 
deliverables expected from each party should be 
clearly outlined, with conflict-resolution processes 
and possible penalties for any breach in the 
arrangements.
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after the Genocide, Report No. 1 7792-RW, www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1
999/06/03/000009265_3980929125140/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf 
2  World Bank Data, ‘Rwanda’, http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda (accessed 6 February 2015).
3  Since the privatisation of the tea industry in 2004, the role of the Office des Cultures Industrielles du 
Rwanda-Composante Thé (OCIR-THE) has been restricted to monitoring and regulation of the sector.
4  There are four forms of tea plantation: (1) industrial tea blocs, (2) tea growers’ cooperatives blocs, (3) tea 
growers’ association blocs, and (4) village tea blocks also known in French as ‘Thé Vlilageois’ (individual 
smallholders’ tea plots on family holdings).
5  COTHENK is a cooperative formed by smallholder tea growers in Nshili and COTHEGAB is a cooperative 
formed by smallholder tea growers in Mushubi. Both cooperatives were initiated by the government.
6  In Mushubi, the government currently also owns a 15 per cent share. However, this is a transitional 
investment, with no strategic decision-making power, hence it has not been included as part of the analysis.
 
7  USD/RWF of 678.4 as of 5.05.15.
8  The government’s 15 per cent share currently owned in Mushubi is a transitional investment, with no 
strategic decision-making power, hence it has not been included as part of the analysis.
9  Tea plots are expensive to maintain, not all members wanted to participate. Any member wanting to grow 
tea directly (as opposed to on the cooperative’s bloc) can access support from PRICE for seedlings as well 
as training, though they need to own land. With only 41 women members growing.
10  This was initially regarded as a repayable loan but was subsequently reformulated as a one-off grant.
11  Key interviews with NAEB’s management.
12  The TV yield is even lower at 0.7 T/ha, and the individual smallholders only started supplying the factory in 
2010.
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